<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Github-Actions on Advancing Engineering</title><link>https://www.advancingengineering.dev/tags/github-actions/</link><description>Recent content in Github-Actions on Advancing Engineering</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 19:16:16 +0100</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.advancingengineering.dev/tags/github-actions/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Supply Chain Security: the second coming of signing provenance</title><link>https://www.advancingengineering.dev/posts/2026-05-supply-chain-security--the-second-coming-of-signing-provenance/</link><pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 08:54:21 +0100</pubDate><guid>https://www.advancingengineering.dev/posts/2026-05-supply-chain-security--the-second-coming-of-signing-provenance/</guid><description>&lt;!-- Summary paragraph (shown in post listings) --&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first wave of software signing asked a simple question: &lt;em&gt;who signed this artifact?&lt;/em&gt;
The next wave asks a harder one: &lt;em&gt;can you prove where it came from, how it was built, and whether it ever left the trusted path?&lt;/em&gt;
That shift, from signing files to signing provenance, is where supply chain security is heading.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>